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Abstract
Adversarial robustness of trained models has attracted considerable attention over recent years, within and
beyond the scientific community. This is not only because of a straight-forward desire to deploy reliable systems,
but also because of how adversarial attacks challenge our beliefs about deep neural networks. Demanding
more robust models seems to be the obvious solution – however, this requires a rigorous understanding of
how one should judge adversarial robustness as a property of a given model. In this work, we analyze where
adversarial examples occur, in which ways they are peculiar, and how they are processed by robust models.
We use robustness curves to show that `∞ threat models are surprisingly effective in improving robustness for
other `p norms; we introduce perturbation cost trajectories to provide a broad perspective on how robust and
non-robust networks perceive adversarial perturbations as opposed to random perturbations; and we explicitly
examine the scale of certain common data sets, showing that robustness thresholds must be adapted to the data set
they pertain to. This allows us to provide concrete recommendations for anyone looking to train a robust model
or to estimate how much robustness they should require for their operation. The code for all our experiments is
available at www.github.com/niklasrisse/adversarial-examples-and-where-to-find-them.
1 Introduction
Adversarial robustness is a property that describes a model’s abil-
ity to behave correctly under small input perturbations that are
crafted with the intent to mislead the model. In recent years, it
has been pointed out that deep neural networks, despite their as-
tonishing success in a wide range of prediction tasks, frequently
lack this property [17, 8]. The study of adversarial robustness
– with its definitions, their implications, attacks, and defenses –
has subsequently attracted considerable research interest. This
is due both to the practical importance of trustworthy models
and the intellectual interest in the differences between decisions
of machine learning models and our human perception.
From a theoretical perspective, this scientific enthusiasm has led
to an analysis of different definitions of adversarial robustness,
their implications in terms of sample complexity and computa-
tional hardness, and the possibility or impossibility of achiev-
ing adversarial robustness under certain distributional assump-
tions [7, 11]. These results on hardness pose an intellectual
challenge: for many domains, a robust and efficient classifier
does exist in the human brain (indeed, adversarial examples are
often motivated by the differences between human and model
classification). If we are not yet able to replicate this artificially,
is it due to our definitions, our models, our data representation,
or our optimization procedures?
From a practical perspective, we have seen the development of
a wide array of defenses against adversarial attacks, most of
which have quickly prompted the development of new attack
methods capable of circumventing them [2, 4, 15, 19, 3]. A
helpful overview of methodological foundations for defense
mechanisms (and thereby indirectly of attack mechanisms) is
given by [3]. Central to the development of an adversarial de-
fense is the specification of a threat model that defines the types
of perturbations which, when applied to real data points, should
*equal contribution
not change the classification behavior of the model. The chal-
lenge then lies in finding a tractable optimization procedure that
satisfies the threat model, and in providing credible empirical or –
ideally – theoretical evidence to show that the resulting model is
indeed robust to all perturbations in the threat model. The most
commonly used threat models are `p ball constrained perturba-
tions, i. e. perturbations with `p norm smaller than a specified
threshold. The most commonly used norms in this context are
`∞, `2 and `1. Under this type of threat model, by definition,
the study of adversarial robustness is closely tied to the dis-
tance of examples to decision boundaries. Constructing models
where adversarial perturbations are rare, then involves directly
or indirectly maximizing margins around decision boundaries1.
One popular defense mechanism for indirectly maximizing mar-
gins is Adversarial Training with Projected Gradient Descent
(AT), which Madry et al. [15] argue provides a natural security
guarantee against first-order adversaries motivated by robust op-
timization. Wong and Kolter [20] introduce a method (KW) with
provable robustness against any norm-bounded perturbation on
the training data by adapting the training process to minimize
an upper bound on the robust loss of the network. Croce et al.
[5] and Croce and Hein [6] achieve improved robustness to `p
norm bounded perturbations by adding a regularization term that
penalizes closeness to decision boundaries and linear regions of
the model (MMR + AT and MMR-UNIV).
For this work, we explicitly decided not to focus on developing
a new adversarial attack or defense. Instead, we explore and
present adversarial robustness from a broader perspective, in
order to increase the community’s understanding of how defense
methods interact with choice of threat model, properties of the
data set, and the way adversarials are processed. We start by
1It should – therefore – not surprise us when algorithms, such as the
Support Vector Machine, that by construction maximize margins, also
lead to adversarially robust models regarding the type of margin they
optimize.
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describing robustness curves [9] in Section 2 as a tool to evaluate
the robustness of specific models and data sets and then study
how robustness depends on distance function, data distribution
and training method. The main part of the paper is structured as
follows:
1. In Section 3, we compare robustness curves for differ-
ent models and different choices of distance functions.
Our goal is to understand how the choice of model
and training method impacts robustness, and to what
extent robustness transfers between distance functions.
For linear classifiers we show theoretically, that the
shape of the robustness curve – representing the global
robustness behaviour – is the same for all norms, and
closeness of the norms can be controlled via sparsity
of the weight vector. For non-linear models we em-
pirically find that robustness transfers to `p norms not
considered in the threat model, and the `∞ threat mod-
els frequently provide better `2 robustness than `2 threat
models.
2. In Section 4, we analyze how adversarial perturba-
tions are perceived by robust and non-robust networks,
specifically compared to random perturbations. To
gain insight, we introduce perturbation cost trajectories,
which offer a broader perspective on how a network
perceives an input, and we find that adversarial pertur-
bations propagate through deep networks in peculiar
ways.
3. Finally, in Section 5, we analyze how scale depends
on the underlying data space, choice of distance func-
tion, and distribution. The main results are that the
robustness curve for one norm-induced distance places
bounds on the robustness curves for all other norm-
induced distances and that the separation between
curves can be extremely large, depending on the model
and underlying data distribution. Based on these find-
ings we suggest that the maximum perturbation size of
threat models should be selected carefully in order to
be meaningful, depending on characteristics of the data
set.
2 Robustness curves
Let us consider what we would actually hope to see when per-
forming an adversarial attack, instead of the small performance-
breaking perturbations one encounters. We would hope to see
either a meaningful – but small – alteration of the original input,
such as an airplane growing eyes, a beak, and plumage, to be
classified as a bird; or a complete dismantling of meaningful
features resulting in unrecognizable noise, where we can readily
accept pseudo-random class predictions. Semantics are crucial
in both scenarios, which leads us to the conviction that our hu-
man perception and classification are integral to the nature of
adversarial examples. Still, we must work with a more rigorous
definition and therefore abstract further, which we do in the
following.
An adversarial perturbation for a classifier f and input-output
pair (x, y) is a small perturbation δ with f (x + δ) , y. The
resulting input x + δ is called an adversarial example. The set
of input-output pairs vulnerable to adversarial perturbations is
the set of data points which the classifier can be induced to
misclassify using small perturbations – that is the set of points
that are either already misclassified, or that lie in some small
distance from the decision boundary. But what does small mean?
How should distance be measured? And what distinguishes
adversarial examples from other data points? These are the
questions we aim to answer in the following sections.
One tool for our study of these questions are robustness
curves [9], which we shortly explain in this section. A robust-
ness curve is the cumulative distribution function of the distance
of points from the decision boundaries of a classifier:
Definition 1. Given an input space X and label space Y, dis-
tance function d on X × X, and classifier f : X → Y. Let
|X| = maxx,x′∈X d(x, x′) and let P denote the data distribution
that generates the samples. Then the d-robustness curve for f is
the graph of the function
R fd : [0, |X|]→ [0, 1]
ε 7→ P({(x, y) s.t. ∃ x′ : d(x, x′) ≤ ε ∧ f (x′) , y})
A model’s robustness curve shows how data points are dis-
tributed in relation to the decision boundaries of the model.
The advantage of this distributional perspective is that it allows a
step back from robustness regarding a specific quantification of
what it means to be close to the decision boundary, and instead
allows us to compare global robustness properties and their de-
pendence on a given classifier, distribution and distance function.
One of the main questions driving this work is how robustness
– and robust training – are affected by the choice of distance
function.
In principle, there exist a wealth of possible distance functions,
and the choice of one particular distance function should depend
on the downstream application domain of the model. For this
work, we will assume that the distance function d is induced
by some norm n on X, i. e. d(x, x′) = n(x − x′). As Göpfert
et al. [10] show, this is not sufficient to encode dissimilarities of
images as perceived by a human, or guarantee that perturbations
are imperceptible to the human eye. However, the majority
of current work on robustness uses distances induced by `p
norms [19]. They are easy to define and well studied, and it is
reasonable to assert that perturbations that are small in some `p
norm typically should not change the classification of real-world
images. In the following, we always assume that the distance
we consider is induced by some norm, usually an `p norm, on a
finite-dimensional vector space. In our experiments we consider
the `1, `2 and `∞ norms, as these are frequently used prototypical
examples.
3 Robustness curves and their
dependence on distance functions
Due to strong concerns about trust in and security of machine
learning models that are susceptible to adversarial perturbations,
the last years have seen significant effort in developing train-
ing methods that produce more robust models. These training
methods typically require the choice of a distance function d
and perturbation threshold ε. The pair (d, ε) is sometimes called
a threat model. The training method will attempt (and possibly
guarantee) to make the model robust against attacks in distance
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d up to size ε. In other words, the objective of the training
method is to minimize R fd(ε). In the following, we analyze to
what extent the minimization of R fd (ε) impacts R
f
d′ (ε
′) for other
choices d′ and ε′.
For the special case of linear classifiers, we find that the global
robustness behavior of a model w. r. t. a data distribution for
all `p norms is fully specified by the model parameters and the
robustness curve for a single `p norm. Thus, we fully understand
the behavior of R fd′ (ε
′) for any `p norm induced distance d′ and
any ε′ based on knowing R fd (·) for one `p norm induced distance
d. This is an extension of a weaker theorem from [9].
Theorem 1. If f is a linear classifier on Rd parameterized by
(~w, b), i. e. f (x) = sgn(wT x + b), then the shape of the robustness
curve for f regarding an `p norm-induced distance does not
depend on the choice of p. There exists a constant c > 0 such
that
R f‖·‖p1 (ε) = R
f
‖·‖p2 (c · ε) ∀ ε. (1)
The distortion factor c is given by
‖w‖q1
‖w‖q2 , where qi =
pi
pi−1 .
We provide a proof in Appendix A. Clearly, the distortion factor
c can be as large as m, where m is the dimensionality of the input
space. See Appendix B.2 for an example where this occurs. One
way to minimize this distortion factor is to encourage sparse
weight vectors. However, as illustrated by Appendix B.2, this
may backfire by worsening robustness for norms the model
would otherwise be robust to, instead of improving robustness
for norms it would otherwise not be robust to.
For more complex decision boundaries, dependence on p can
be more than a question of scale. The shape of the robustness
curve may depend on p, i. e. the distribution of the distances
between points and decision boundary may be different for differ-
ent choices of p. See Figure 1 for an example. In the following,
we empirically evaluate robustness curves for different models
to investigate how robustification efforts transfer across norms.
For complex models, exactly calculating the distance of a point
to the closest decision boundary, and thus estimating the robust-
ness curve, is computationally very intensive, if not intractable.
Instead, we bound the true robustness curve from below using
adversarial attacks. To verify that this approach is justified, we
compare a robustness curve estimated using adversarial attacks
to one based on exact calculation of distances to the decision
boundary on a simple robust model. We observe that the shape
and scale of the curves are very similar, especially for small
perturbation sizes, which are most relevant in assessing the ro-
bustness of the model. See Appendix D.1 for detailed results.
We compare `∞ and `2 robustness curves for different robustified
models from the literature. The network architecture we use in
our analysis is a convolutional network with two convolutional
layers, two fully connected layers and ReLu activation functions.
We compare the following training methods:
1. Standard training (ST), i. e. training without specific
robustness considerations.
2. Adversarial training (AT), see Madry et al. [15].
3. Training with robust loss (KW), see Wong and Kolter
[20].
4. Maximum margin regularization for a single `p norm
together with adversarial training (MMR + AT), see Croce
et al. [5]
5. Maximum margin regularization simultaneously for `∞
and `1 margins (MMR-UNIV), see Croce and Hein [6].
Together with each training method, we state the threat model the
model is optimized to guarantee (e. g. Threat Model: `∞( = 0.1)
for robustness guarantees in `∞ norm for `∞ = 0.1), if available.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the trained models are those
made publicly available2 by Croce et al. [5] and Croce and
Hein [6]. We use six datasets: MNIST, Fashion-MNIST (FMNIST),
German Traffic Signs (GTS) [12], CIFAR-10, Tiny-Imagenet-
200 (TINY-IMG) [14], and Human Activity Recognition (HAR)
[1]. For specifics on model training, refer to Appendix C. Mod-
els are generally trained on the full training set for the corre-
sponding data set, and robustness curves evaluated on the full
test set, unless stated otherwise. See Appendix D.2 for examples
of adversarial perturbations optimized for different norms and
different models, which provides intuition on how norm con-
straints and adversarial defenses affect adversarial perturbations.
First, we compute `2 and `∞ robustness curves on MNIST for the
five different training methods mentioned above, each for `2 and
`∞ threat models, except for MMR-UNIV which simultaneously
defends against attacks in all `p norms. The results can be seen
in Figure 2. We find that for AT and MMR + AT, the `∞ threat
model leads to better robustness than the `2 threat model both
for `∞ and `2 robustness curves. In fact, MMR + AT with the `∞
threat model even leads to better `∞ and `2 robustness curves
than MMR-UNIV, which is specifically designed to improve ro-
bustness for all `p norms. For KW, interestingly the `∞ threat
model leads to better `∞ robustness than the `2 threat model only
for perturbation sizes up to around 0.15, and the `2 threat model
only leads to better `2 robustness than the `∞ threat model up to
perturbation size around 1.2, after which the two curves intersect.
For all three training methods under the `∞ threat model, we
observe a noticeable change in slope of the `∞ robustness curve
between perturbation sizes 0.1 and 0.2 (perturbation size in the
threat model chosen to be 0.1 in each case). MMR + AT is signif-
icant in that the change in slope occurs later than in the other
models, even though the target perturbation size is identically
0.1. Each method leads to significantly improved robustness
curves as compared to ST, even beyond the perturbation sizes
specified by the threat model.
Because perturbations sizes in `∞ and `2 norm tend to be very
different, it is difficult to compare robustness curves for the two
norms in a single plot. In Figure 3, we introduce two methods
of rescaling to better compare the shapes of the curves. With
method 1, we rescale the `∞ robustness curve by the mean ratio
R‖·‖2 (ε)
R‖·‖∞ (ε)
between the curves. This method allows us to see even
more clearly how the `∞ robustness curve for MMR + AT with `∞
threat model changes slope around the target perturbation size,
which does not occur in the `2 robustness curve for any of the
training methods. With method 2, we rescale the `∞ robustness
curve by the mean ratio ‖x‖2‖x‖∞ for all points x in the data set.
The benefit of this rescaling method is that it does not require
2www.github.com/fra31/mmr-universal, www.github.com/
max-andr/provable-robustness-max-linear-regions
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Figure 1: A model with a non-linear decision boundary and three differently shaped robustness curves.
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Figure 2: Robustness curves resulting from different training methods (MMR + AT, MMR-UNIV (first column), KW (second column),
and AT (third column), always with ST for comparison) and different threat models (indicated by color), measured in the `∞ norm
(first row) and the `2 norm (second row).
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Figure 3: Scaled and unscaled robustness curves for different training methods. Scaling methods are indicated by color. Training
methods are indicated by plot titles.
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computation of both curves, but, at least empirically, can still
provide an estimate of the `2 robustness curve or vice versa. It is
interesting to see that method 2 overestimates the `2 robustness
curve for ST, underestimates it for MMR + AT with the `∞ threat
model, and almost perfectly estimates it for MMR + AT with the `2
threat model. This reinforces that compared to standard training,
MMR + AT with both the `∞ and `2 threat models improve `∞
robustness more strongly than `2 robustness.
Figure 4 shows `∞ robustness curves for MMR + AT with `∞ threat
model as provided by Croce et al. [5]. The models trained on
MNIST and FMNIST both show the characteristic change in slope.
Further, the robustness curves for CIFAR-10 and GTS show that
the models for these two data sets, which were trained with much
smaller target perturbation sizes, are very non-robust compared
to the former two models and do not have a visually detectable
change in slope. We will revisit the question of which target
perturbation level to choose in dependence on the data set in
Section 5.
4 How adversarial perturbations are
processed
In the previous section, our focus was on how robust training
methods impact the robustness curve of the resulting model.
Now, we investigate how they impact the way the neural network
“perceives” adversarial perturbations. Instead of only looking
at the perturbed input and the resulting (mis-)classification, we
follow the effects of a perturbation along every step along its
way through the network – i. e. at each layer. As a tool for this,
we introduce perturbation cost trajectories.
Definition 2. Let f : Rm → Rl be the function calculated by
a neural network, where m is the input dimensionality, l is the
cardinality of the label space, and the output of f are the softmax
probabilities for each class. Let k be the number of layers in
the network. For x ∈ Rm and i ∈ {0, . . . , k} let fi(x) denote
the output of the first i layers of the network, applied to x. In
particular, f0(x) = x and fk(x) = f (x). Let x be an input to the
network, let ∆ ∈ Rm be a perturbation and let ‖ · ‖ denote a norm.
Then the perturbation cost of ∆ for x at layer i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} is
defined as
Cix(∆) :=
‖ fi(x + ∆) − fi(x)‖
‖ fi(x)‖ . (2)
The perturbation cost of ∆ at layer k is Ckx(∆) = 1 f (x+∆), f (x). The
perturbation cost trajectory of ∆ at x is the sequence
(
Cix(∆)
)k
i=1
.
Adversarial versus random perturbations
In the following, we present and discuss several perturbation
cost trajectories for a simple architecture trained with either ST
or MMR + AT3. We perturb 1000 data points from the MNIST test
set and feed them through the network – then, for comparison,
we sample random perturbations of the exact same size and
trace those through the network4 For each trained model, this
yields two pairs of curves – one for the `∞ norm and one for
3We limit our analysis to the least and most effective methods,
respectively, because of computational (and time) constraints.
4See Appendices C.2 and C.3 for details on how we construct the
perturbations.
the `2 norm. Perturbation cost trajectories are computed w. r. t.
the norm that the perturbation is optimized for. This allows a
number of observations (cf. Figure 5):
1. For all three models, data points perturbed with ran-
dom noise are almost never misclassified, compared
to (by construction) all data points with adversarial
perturbations.
2. Only perturbation costs of `2 scaled perturbations de-
crease monotonously with each additional layer.
3. In the non-robust network, perturbation costs for adver-
sarial perturbations are amplified by each layer.
4. Perturbation cost trajectories for adversarial perturba-
tions are similar for `2-optimized adversarial perturba-
tions and `∞-optimized adversarial perturbations.
5. Perturbation costs for random perturbations in `∞ norm
decrease more slowly than those for `2 norm. For the
model robustified to `∞ < 0.1, the random perturbation
cost trajectory mirrors that of the adversarial pertur-
bations, but leads to misclassification in only approxi-
mately 10 % of cases.
By construction, adversarial examples are close to a decision
boundary, but what about the rest of their surroundings? In
Figure 6, we present perturbation cost trajectories for random
perturbations added to adversarial perturbations. We observe
that, although each adversarial example is misclassified (as that
is how it was constructed), only a small fraction of points in its
immediate vicinity are also misclassified. However, contrary
to what we see for random perturbations added to the original
inputs (cf. Figure 5), perturbation costs for random perturba-
tions on top of adversarial perturbations do not decrease layer
by layer – instead, the average perturbation cost trajectory for
the adversarial perturbation with random noise follows the aver-
age perturbation cost trajectory for the adversarial perturbations.
The two trajectories only separate in the argmax layer. This
shows that perturbations in the general vicinity of the adversar-
ial perturbation, are not abstracted away by the neural network
processing, although most of them do not affect the final classifi-
cation. We also observe that a much larger proportion of points
in the vicinity of the adversarial examples for the `2-robustified
model are misclassified than for the `∞-robustified model.
Since `∞ robustification also improves `2 robustness and vice
versa (see Section 3), one might expect that adversarial examples
themselves transfer between the models robustified for different
norms. To explore this, we find adversarial perturbations for
each trained model and calculate the respective trajectories not
only for said model, but for all three models – see Figure 7.
The adversarial perturbations are only successful against the
models upon which they were created. In fact, both robustified
models process “foreign” adversarial perturbations similarly
to `∞-scaled random perturbations. Perhaps surprisingly, the
non-robust ST model manages to correctly classify almost all
“foreign” adversarial examples, even though the perturbations
are relatively large.
All in all, we observe that both models trained with MMR + AT
have less variation in perturbation costs across layers than the
non-robust ST model. We are surprised by how strongly the
perturbation cost trajectory decreases for `2-scaled random per-
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Figure 4: Approximated l∞ robustness curves for multiple data sets. Each curve is calculated for a different model and a different
test data set. The data sets are indicated by the labels. The models are trained with MMR + AT, Threat Models: MNIST: `∞( = 0.1),
FMNIST: `∞( = 0.1), GTS: `∞( = 4/255), CIFAR-10: `∞( = 2/255).
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training methods. The labels of the curves show the perturbation type and random perturbation size of the individual curves. The
training methods are indicated by the subplots titles.
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Figure 7: Perturbation cost trajectories for `∞ adversarial perturbations (optimized for different threat models) for models trained
with different training methods. The labels of the curves show the perturbation type and the model, for which the perturbation was
optimized. The training methods are indicated by the column titles.
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turbations, for all three models. Our finding that “foreign” adver-
sarial examples are repelled is at odds with the observation that
for black-box attacks, transfer of adversarial examples between
different models seems to be crucial.
5 Scale of robustness curves
The dependence of scale on the norm
In Section 3, we showed examples of how different the scale of
robustness curves (as characterized, for example, by the average
distance of a sample from a decision boundary) can be, both
based on the distance function chosen as well as the data set
under consideration. In the following, we present some con-
siderations on how heavily scale may vary, and end with some
practical recommendations for practitioners working with popu-
lar data sets. We begin by observing that on finite-dimensional
vector spaces, one robustness curve places natural bounds on all
others that represent distances induced by norms:
Proposition 1. Let X be a finite-dimensional vector space. Let
d and d′ be two distance measures on X that are induced by
norms. Then there exist constants c1, c2 > 0 such that for every
classifier f ,
R fd′ (c1ε) ≤ R fd (ε) ≤ R fd′ (c2ε) ∀ε. (3)
See Appendix B.1 for the proof. Even restricting ourselves to
`p norm-induced distances, if is clear that the bounds provided
by Proposition 1 are not necessarily informative. As noted in
the discussion for Theorem 1, even for this reduced class of
distances, the constants c1, c2 can lead to a very broad range.
For example, we find
R f‖·‖∞ (ε) ≤ R
f
‖·‖1 (ε) ≤ R
f
‖·‖∞ (mε) (4)
where m is the data dimensionality, and these inequalities are
tight. See Appendix B.2 for an example of a data distribution
where we construct two classifiers with identical `∞ robustness,
but `1 robustness that differs by a factor of m. Consequently, at
least in high dimensions, the scale of a robustness curve can, but
doesn’t necessarily depend strongly on the choice of norm.
Scale for specific data sets
Robustness curves allow us to analyze robustness globally, with-
out focusing too much on (more or less) arbitrary thresholds.
Nonetheless, the question of scale remains. Which perturbations
should one consider “large” or “small”? One of the underlying
assumptions in the definition of adversarial examples is that
when f (x′) , y, x′ is being incorrectly classified, i. e. f (x′) = y
would be the correct classification choice. The question of
scale therefore cannot be answered independently of the data
distribution. In order to understand how to interpret different
perturbation sizes, it can be helpful to understand how strongly
the data point would need to be perturbed to actually change the
correct classification. In this section, we analyze this question
for several popular data sets.
Recall that for two differently labeled points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2),
with x1 , x2 and y1 , y2, the perturbation x2 − x1 when applied
to x1 hopefully leads to a change in prediction, but it can hardly
be considered adversarial. Instead, it can provide some sense
of scale and serve as an upper bound on reasonable robustness
thresholds: when a perturbation is large enough to change an
input such that the result should correctly be assigned a different
label, it might not be sensible to expect a model to be robust
against it. Similarly, when a perturbation does not even “reach”
the closest point of the same label, it probably should not be able
to influence a model’s prediction. Of course, this is subject to
the concrete distribution in question and depends on the specific
sampled data that is available.
When we look at the respective numbers for the MNIST test
set in the `∞, `2, and `1 norms, we can make several observa-
tions. See Figure 8 for the distributions of distances between
points and their closest neighbors from the same class and dif-
ferent classes. Because the smallest inter-class distance in the
`∞ norm is around 0.9, we can see that transforming an input
from one class to one from a different class almost always re-
quires completely flipping at least one pixel from almost-black
to almost-white or vice versa. Transforming within a given class
frequently requires only a smaller perturbation. For the `2 and
`1 norms, the inter-class distance distributions are more spread
out than the `∞ inter-class distance distribution. We observe
that with `2 perturbations of size ≥ 3, it becomes possible to
transform samples from different classes into each other, so start-
ing from this threshold, any classifier must necessarily trade off
between accuracy and robustness.
Now that we have developed a certain sense of scale w. r. t.
MNIST, let us compare it to two further data sets, namely GTS
and TINY-IMG. We present the inter- and intra-class distance
distributions in the `∞ norm (where all distances lie in the inter-
val [0, 1]) in Figure 9. The shapes of the curves differ strongly
between data sets, and – most notably – for TINY-IMG, the dis-
tance of each point to the nearest neighbor from a different class
is smaller than the distance to the nearest neighbor within the
same class. Presumably, this is due to high data dimensionality,
a large number of classes, and relatively large variation within a
given class, when compared to MNIST– refer to Table 1 for exact
values.
Finally, we compare the inter-class distance distributions in `∞,
`2, and `1 norm for all data sets considered in this work – see
Figure 10. We observe that for the `1 norm, the shape of the
curves is similar across data sets, but their extent is determined
by the dimensionality. In the `∞ norm, vastly different curves
emerge for the different data sets. We hypothesize that, because
the inter-class distance distributions vary more strongly for `∞
distances than for `1 distances, the results of robustifying a
model w. r. t. `∞ distances may depend more strongly on the
underlying data distribution than the results of robustifying w. r. t.
`1 distances. This is an interesting avenue for future work. In
any case, it is safe to say that, when judging the robustness of
a model by a certain threshold, that number must be set with
respect to the scale of the distribution the model operates on.
In Table 1, we summarize the smallest and largest inter-class
distances in different norms together with additional information
about the size, number of classes, and dimensionality of the all
the data sets we consider in this work. The values correspond
directly to Figure 10, but even in this simplified view, we can
quickly make out key differences between the data sets. Com-
pare, for example, MNIST and GTS: While it appears entirely
reasonable to expect `∞ robustness of 0.5 for MNIST, the same
Preprint – Adversarial examples and where to find them 8
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
distance in l∞
0
20
40
60
80
100
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
p
o
in
ts
`∞ distances
closest distance to point from same class
closest distance to point from other class
0 2 4 6 8 10
distance in l2
`2 distances
closest distance to point from same class
closest distance to point from other class
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
distance in l1
`1 distances
closest distance to point from same class
closest distance to point from other class
Figure 8: Minimum inter- and intra-class distances in different `p norms. Red curves: Sorted closest distances of each point to the
closest point of the same class. Blue curves: Sorted closest distances of each point to the closest point of a different class. Left:
Distance Measured in `∞. Middle: Distance measured in `2. Right: Distance measured in `1. Data set is the full MNIST test set
(10 000 points).
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Figure 9: Minimum inter- and intra-class `∞ distances for three data sets. Red curves: Sorted closest `∞ distances of each point to
the closest point of the same class. Blue curves: Sorted closest distances of each point to the closest point of a different class. Left:
10 000 points from MNIST test data set. Middle:10 000 points from GTS test data set. Right: 9832 points from TINY-IMG test set.
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Table 1: Smallest and largest inter-class distances for subsets of several data sets, measured in l∞, l2, and l1 norm, together with
basic contextual information about the data sets. All data has been been normalized to lie within the interval [0, 1], and duplicates
and corrupted data points have been removed. Besides HAR, all data sets contain images – the dimensionality reported specifies
their sizes and number of channels.
Inter-class Distance
Smallest Largest
Dataset Samples Classes Dimensionality l∞ l2 l1 l∞ l2 l1
MNIST 10 000 10 28 × 28 × 1 0.88 3.03 19.16 1.00 10.18 132.38
TINY-IMG 98 139 200 64 × 64 × 3 0.27 5.24 369.29 0.71 47.49 4184.37
FMNIST 10 000 10 28 × 28 × 1 0.36 2.00 24.87 1.00 10.70 194.29
GTS 10 000 43 32 × 32 × 3 0.07 0.90 31.46 0.62 19.54 833.22
CIFAR-10 10 000 10 32 × 32 × 3 0.27 3.61 130.77 0.70 18.57 831.44
HAR 2947 6 561 0.26 1.26 12.95 0.87 4.29 73.19
threshold for GTS is not possible. Relating Table 1 and Fig-
ure 4, we find entirely plausible the strong robustness results
for MNIST, and the small perturbation threshold for GTS. Based
on inter-class distances we also expect less `∞ robustness for
CIFAR-10 than for FMNIST, but not as seen in Figure 10.
Overall, the strong dependence of robustness curve scaling on
the data set and the chosen norm, emphasizes the necessity of
informed and conscious decisions regarding robustness thresh-
olds. We hope that Table 1 can provide an easy reference when
judging scales in a threat model.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated the relationships between adversarial de-
fenses, the threat models they address, and the robustness of a
model w. r. t. small perturbations in different norms, using robust-
ness curves and perturbation cost trajectories. We have found
that `∞ threat models are surprisingly effective in improving
robustness for other `p norms, and hope that future defenses will
be evaluated from this perspective. We have used perturbation
cost trajectories to gain a broader view on how robust and non-
robust networks perceive adversarial perturbations as opposed
to random perturbations. Finally, we have seen how suitable
robustness thresholds necessarily depend on the data set under
consideration.
It is our hope that practitioners and researchers alike will use the
methodology proposed in this work, especially when develop-
ing and analyzing adversarial defenses, and carefully motivate
any threat models they might choose, taking into account the
available context.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. If f is a linear classifier on Rm parameterized by
(~w, b), i. e. f (x) = sgn(~wT x + b), then the shape of the robustness
curve for f regarding an `p norm-induced distance does not
depend on the choice of p. I.e. there exists a c > 0 such that
R f‖·‖p1 (ε) = R
f
‖·‖p2 (c · ε) (5)
The distortion factor c is given by
‖w‖q1
‖w‖q2 , where qi =
pi
pi−1 .
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ Rm with wT x + b , 0. Let p ∈ [1,∞] and q
such that 1p +
1
q = 1, where we take
1
∞ = 0. Then
min{‖δ‖p : sgn(wT (x+δ)+b) , sgn(wT x+b)} = |w
T + b|
‖w‖q (6)
and the minimum is attained by
δ =
−w
T x−b
‖w‖∞ sgn(w j)e j, j = argmaxi |wi| p = 1
−wT x−b
‖w‖qq (sgn(wi)|wi|
1
p−1 )di=1 p ∈ (1,∞] .
(7)
where x
1
∞−1 = x0 = 1 and e j is the j-th unit vector.
Proof. By Hölder’s inequality, for any δ,
m∑
i=1
|wiδi| ≤ ‖δ‖p‖w‖q . (8)
For δ such that sgn(wT (x + δ) + b) , sgn(wT x + b) it follows that
‖δ‖p ≥
∑m
i=1 |wiδi|
‖w‖q ≥
|∑mi=1 wiδi|
‖w‖q ≥
|wT x + b|
‖w‖q . (9)
Using the identity q = pp−1 , it is easy to check that for every
p ∈ [1,∞], with δ as defined in Equation (7),
1. wTδ = −wT x − b, so that wT (x + δ) + b = 0, and
2. ‖δ‖p = |wT x+b|‖w‖q .
Item 1 shows that δ is a feasible point, while Item 2 in combina-
tion with Equation (9) shows that ‖δ‖p is minimal.
Using Lemma 1, we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. By definition,
R f‖·‖p1 (ε) = P({(x, y) s.t. ∃ δ : ‖δ‖p1 ≤ ε ∧ f (x + δ) , y}︸                                                ︷︷                                                ︸
Rp1 (ε)
) . (10)
We can split Rp1 (ε) into the disjoint sets
{(x, y) : f (x) , y}︸               ︷︷               ︸
=M
(11)
∪˙ (12)
{(x, y) s.t. ∃ δ : ‖δ‖p1 ≤ ε ∧ y = f (x) , f (x + δ)}︸                                                          ︷︷                                                          ︸
=Bp1 (ε)
. (13)
Choose q1, q2 such that 1pi +
1
qi
= 1. By Lemma 1, and using that
f (x) = sgn(wT x + b),
Bp1 (ε) = {(x, y) : sgn(wT x + b) = y ∧
|wT x + b|
‖w‖q1
≤ ε} (14)
= {(x, y) : sgn(wT x + b) = y ∧ |w
T x + b|
‖w‖q2
≤ ‖w‖q1‖w‖q2
ε})
(15)
= Bp2
( ‖w‖q1
‖w‖q2
ε
)
. (16)
This shows that
R f‖·‖p1 (ε) = P(M) + P(Bp1 (ε)) (17)
= P(M) + P
(
Bp2
(‖w‖q1
‖w‖q2
ε
))
(18)
= R f‖·‖p2
(‖w‖q1
‖w‖q2
ε
)
. (19)
B Robustness curve separation
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Let X be a finite-dimensional vector space. Let
d and d′ be two distance measures on X that are induced by
norms. Then there exist constants c1, c2 > 0 such that for every
classifier f ,
R fd′ (c1ε) ≤ R fd (ε) ≤ R fd′ (c2ε) ∀ε. (20)
Proof. If X is a finite-dimensional vector space, it is known that
any two norms on X are equivalent, i.e. for any two norms n, n′
on X there exist constants c1, c2 > 0 such that for all x ∈ X
n(x) ≤ c1n′(x) and n′(x) ≤ c2n(x). (21)
For a distance function d and perturbation size ε, let
Rd(ε) := {(x, y) s.t. ∃x′ : f (x′) , y ∧ d(x, x′) ≤ ε} , (22)
so that Rd(ε) = P(Rd(ε)). Let d, d′ be induced by the norms
n, n′. If (x, y) ∈ Rd′(c1ε), it follows that (x, y) ∈ Rd(ε), and if
(x, y) ∈ Rd(ε), it follows that (x, y) ∈ Rd′ (c2ε). As a result,
R fd′ (c1ε) ≤ R fd (ε) ≤ R fd′ (c2ε) . (23)
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Class 1 Class 2 Sparse classifier Dense classifier
Figure 11: Left two images: the types of images distinguished between in the toy classification problem. Second from the right: a
sparse weight vector, the result of a `1-regularized linear SVM, with one non-zero entry. Right: a dense weight vector, the result
of a `2-regularized linear SVM, with no non-zero entries. The vectors are reshaped to 16 × 16. Black corresponds to −1, beige
corresponds to 1, and reddish colors correspond to values 0 or close to 0.
Adversarial for sparse classifier Adversarial for both classifiers
Figure 12: Left: an image that is incorrectly classified by the
sparse classifier, but not the dense classifier. Right: an image
that is misclassified by both classifiers.
B.2 Example of robustness curve separation
As an illustrative toy example of how strongly the robustness
curves for different norms can be separated, consider the fol-
lowing classification task. The goal is two distinguish between
the two types of 16 × 16-pixel images in Figure 11. Running
a `1-regularized linear SVM on this data leads to the sparse
weight vector schematically represented in Figure 11, with just
one non-zero entry. Running a `2-regularized linear SVM leads
to the dense weight vector also schematically represented in
Figure 11, with all non-zero entries.
Both classifiers have 100% accuracy, and all samples are at `∞-
distance 1 from both decision boundaries, i.e. the `∞ robustness
curves of both classifiers are identical. However, the `1 robust-
ness curves of the two classifiers are maximally separated: for
the sparse classifier, the `1 robustness curve is a step function at
1, while for the dense classifier, it is a step function at 256, the
dimensionality of the data. Figure 12 shows adverarial examples
for the two classifiers. For the sparse classifier, it is sufficient to
flip a single pixel, while for the dense classifier, more noticeable
changes are necessary.
C Experimental details
C.1 Model training
We use the same model architecture as [5] and [20]. Unless
explicitly stated otherwise, the trained models are taken from
[5]. The exact architecture of the model is: Convolutional layer
(number of filters: 16, size: 4x4, stride: 2), ReLu activation
function, convolutional layer (number of filters: 32, size: 4x4,
stride: 2), ReLu activation function, fully connected layer
(number of units: 100), ReLu activation function, output layer
(number of units depends on the number of classes). All models
are trained with Adam Optimizer [13] for 100 epochs, with
batch size 128 and a default learning rate of 0.001. More infor-
mation on the training can be found in the experimental details
section of the appendix of [5]. All models are publicly available
in the GitHub repositories of [5] and [6]: www.github.com/
max-andr/provable-robustness-max-linear-regions
and www.github.com/fra31/mmr-universal.
C.2 Approximated robustness curves
We use state-of-the-art adversarial attacks to approximate the
true minimal distances of input datapoints to the decision bound-
ary of a classifier for our adversarial robustness curves (see
Definition 1). We base our selection of attacks on the recom-
mendations of [3]. Specifically, we use the following attacks:
For `1 robustness curves we use EAD, [4], for `2 robustness
curves we use [2] and for `∞ robustness curves we use [15].
For all three attacks, we use the implementations of Foolbox
[16]. For the `∞ attack, we use the standard hyperparameters
of the Foolbox implementation. For the `1 and `2 attacks we
increase the number of binary search steps that are used to find
the optimal tradeoff-constant between distance and confidence
from 5 to 10, which we found empirically to improve the results.
For the rest of the hyperparameters, we again use the standard
values of the Foolbox implementation.
C.3 Generating random perturbations
We compare perturbation cost trajectories for adversarial pertur-
bations and random perturbations. In the following, we specify
how the random perturbations are generated. Let ∆ be the per-
turbation that we want to generate. ∆ is a m-dimensional vector,
where m is defined by the number of input features of the original
input. Let s be the target size of the noise.
If the target size is measured in `∞ norm, we sample
∆ ∼ s · (σi)mi=1 (24)
where the σi are i.i.d. Rademacher variables, i.e. uniformly
distributed on {±1}. This method of sampling is based on the
Fast Gradient Sign Method, and means that our random noise is
large as possible under the `∞ norm constraints we impose.
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Figure 13: True and approximated robustness curves for `∞
norm. The model is trained on MNIST with MMR+AT, Threat
Model: `∞( = 0.1). We use a different model architecture
to reduce the runtime of the exact robustness evaluation. The
model architecture is: INPUT, FC(1024), RELU. Both curves
are calculated for 100 points of the MNIST test set. The true
robustness curve is calculated using the Mixed Integer Program-
ming method from [18]. The approximated curve is calculated
using the PGD attack decribed in [15].
If the target size is measured in `2 norm, we let
∆ = s · X‖X‖2 (25)
where X ∼ Nm(0, Im), i. e. we sample a vector from a Gaussian
distribution and scale it to the desired length.
C.4 Computational architecture
We executed all programs on an architecture with 2 x Intel
Xeon(R) CPU E5-2640 v4 @ 2.4 GHz, 2 x Nvidia GeForce
GTX 1080 TI 12G and 128 GB RAM.
D Addit ional experiments
D.1 Justifying approximated robustness curves
We’ve compared approximated and true `∞ curves to justify
our use of approximate robustness curves. For computational
reasons, this was done only for MNIST, and for a smaller ar-
chitecture than our other experiments, and not for `2 curves.
The results can be seen in Figure 13. We observe that the
curves track each other reasonably well, especially for small
perturbation sizes, which is the most interesting region. Due to
computational constraints, we did not perform this comparison
for the more complicated architecture our other experiments
are based on. The calculation of the exact robustness curve in
Figure 13 took 2 days and 22 hours on our computational setup
(see Appendix C for details). We started calculation of the exact
curves for the architecture used in our other experiments, but
had to cancel after 14 days, since not even a single data point
had been evaluated.
D.2 Adversarial attack intuition
In order to provide intuition on how adversarial examples differ
based on the choice of norm and defense, we show adversarial
attacks to an image from GTS in Figure 14.
D.3 Distinguishing between defended and non-defended
adversarial perturbations
Figure 5 gives the impression that the MMR + AT (`∞) model does
not reduce perturbation costs of random `∞ perturbations as
the other models do (although only a small number of these
perturbations lead to misclassification). To verify that this is not
simply due to the larger perturbation size made necessary for
the robustified model, we calculate perturbation cost trajectories
separated by the size of the adversarial perturbation (defended
against or part of the percentage not defended against). For both
cases, and thus for both perturbation magnitudes, we observe
the same effect.
D.4 Calculating inter-class distances
In Figure 16, we show minimum inter-class distances of `∞, `2
and `1 norm for subsets of commonly used data sets. We can
observe, that for all norms and all data sets we examined, a
small sample (10 % to 25 %) of the data is sufficient to reliably
estimate the minimum inter-class distance of the full data set.
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Figure 14: Adversarial examples for robust/non-robust models and different norms. The adversarial examples are generated with
adversarial attacks (`∞: Projected Gradient Descent Attack (PGD) as suggested in [15], `2: Carlini Wagner L2 Attack (CW) as
suggested in [2], `1: Elastic-net attack (EAD) as suggested in [4]). The adversarial perturbations are scaled by factor 10 to increase
visibility. We show adversarial examples for three different models. The training methods are indicated by the labels on the y-axes.
The original image is taken from GTS.
INPUTCONV RELU CONV RELU FC RELU FCARGMAX
layer
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p
er
tu
rb
a
ti
o
n
co
st
s
mean perturbation cost trajectories
for robust model
divided by class
(1) adversarial pert., optimized for l∞ with 0.0 < l∞ < 0.1
random pert., same size as (1)
(2) adversarial pert., optimized for l∞ with 0.1 < l∞ < inf
random pert., same size as (2)
Figure 15: Perturbation cost trajectories for `∞ adversarial perturbations and random perturbations for a robust model, separated
by class (defended against vs. not defended against). The curves show the mean perturbation costs for a subset of 1000 datapoints
of the MNIST test set, that falls into the respective class. The labels of the curves show the perturbation type and the class of the
individual curves. The model is trained with MMR+AT, Threat Model: `∞( = 0.1).
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Figure 16: Minimum inter-class differences for subsets of different data sets, measured in `∞, `2 and `1 norm.
